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STICKING THE LANDING: HOW THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S
DECISION IN BIEDIGER V. QUINNIPIAC UNIV. CAN HELP
COMPETITIVE CHEERLEADING ACHIEVE “SPORT” STATUS
UNDER TITLE IX
“Cheerleading is no longer the stuff of Sandra Dee –
it has become an athletic event.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Laura Jackson was fourteen years old when, in an attempt to do
a back handspring for varsity cheerleading tryouts, she broke two
vertebrae in her back leaving her paralyzed from the neck down.2
Eileen Bangaoli tore her anterior cruciate ligament, a season-end-
ing injury for professional athletes, but continued to compete on
her cheerleading team for more than a year.3  Krista Parks suffered
severe brain trauma after being dropped twenty feet onto her head
during a cheerleading practice.4  Despite the clear risk of injury
and the athletic ability required for membership on a competitive
cheerleading team, to some, including the Second Circuit, what
these girls do is not yet a sport under Title IX of the Educational
Amendments of 1972.5
1. Katie Dowd, Beyond Beauty: Cheerleading’s Terrifying Danger, THE POST GAME
(Dec. 19, 2011, 7:17 AM), http://www.thepostgame.com/features/201112/be-
yond-beauty-cheerleading-terrifying-danger (revealing that Laura Jackson suffered
paralyzing spinal injury attempting to do back handspring in preparation for try-
ing out for varsity cheerleading squad).  “Jackson’s head cracked so violently
against the floor that a piece of her scalp ripped off, and she lay there, gasping for
breath that didn’t come.” Id.
2. See id. (providing example of risk of injury).
3. See Wayne Drehs, Athletes Are Cheerleaders, Too, ESPN (Mar. 15, 2004), http:/
/sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=drehs/040316 (noting that ACL in-
jury has ended seasons for professional athletes like Jason White, Willis McGahee,
and Aaron Boone).
4. See Dowd, supra note 1 (providing second example of risk of injury). R
5. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 105 (2d Cir. 2012) [hereinaf-
ter Biediger III] (holding competitive cheerleading was not sport under Title IX);
Ashlee A. Cassman, Comment, Bring It On! Cheerleading vs. Title IX: Could Cheerlead-
ing Ever Be Considered an Athletic Opportunity Under Title IX, and If So, What Implica-
tions Would That Have on University Compliance?, 17 SPORTS LAW. J. 246 (2010)
(“Those against recognizing cheerleading as a sport point to the lack of competi-
tion, lack of objective scoring to determine a winner, lack of physical contact, and
the fact that cheerleading’s overriding purpose is to support other athletes.” (cit-
ing Howard Wasserman, The Significance of Defining Sport, SPORTS LAW BLOG, (Dec.
28, 2008, 11:05 PM), http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2008_12_01_archive.html;
Cheerleading, Drill Team, Danceline and Band as Varsity Sports: The Foundation Position,
(153)
1
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The issue of whether cheerleading is a sport is one that is se-
verely polarizing among sports authorities, athletes, and academic
institutions.6  Cheerleading has evolved from a sideline sideshow to
a competitive event that arguably exhibits levels of athleticism com-
parable to any other sport.7  Specifically, one of the major missing
links for competitive cheerleading is the lack of recognition that it
is a sport under Title IX.8  In Biediger v. Quinnipiac University, the
Second Circuit held that for the purposes of Title IX, competitive
cheerleading could not count as a varsity sport.9  Despite the hold-
ing in Biediger, the ruling helps competitive cheerleading in its fight
to be considered a sport under Title IX.10  The court in Biediger
provided specific reasons why cheerleading should not yet be con-
sidered a sport for the purposes of Title IX, and that specificity has
shed some light on how cheerleading can obtain the “sport”
designation.11
This Casenote evaluates the Second Circuit’s decision in
Biediger and how the decision should not be considered a setback in
the fight to have competitive cheerleading considered a sport for
the purposes of Title IX.12  Part II narrates the events leading up to
the suit against Quinnipiac University (hereinafter “Quinnipiac” or
WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUNDATION, http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/en/
home/advocate/title-ix-and-issues/title-ix-positions/cheerleading_drill_team_
danceline_and_band_as_varsity_sports (last visited Dec. 24, 2013)).  For a detailed
discussion of the function and purpose of Title IX, see infra notes 31-34 and ac- R
companying text.
6. See generally Cassman, supra note 5 (setting forth arguments for and against
whether cheerleading should be considered sport).
7. See Katie Thomas, Gender Games – Born on Sideline, Cheering Clamors to Be
Sport, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
05/23/sports/gender-games-born-on-sideline-cheering-clamors-to-be-sport.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=1& (“While cheerleading evokes images of pompoms and
pleated skirts, it has relied on increasingly athletic feats of grace and strength in
recent years.”).
8. For a detailed discussion on the Department of Education’s position on
cheerleading, see infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.  For a discussion on R
how the “Sport” designation under Title IX avails an athletic activity of additional
benefits such as scholarships for participants and better training equipment, see
infra note 174 and accompanying text. R
9. See Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 105 (summarizing holding with respect to com-
petitive cheerleading).
10. For a discussion of how the ruling in Biediger III may actually bring com-
petitive cheerleading closer to being considered a sport for the purposes of Title
IX, see infra notes 185-190 and accompanying text. R
11. See Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 103-05 (detailing characteristics that distinguish
competitive cheerleading from other varsity sports).
12. For a more detailed discussion of the Second Circuit’s decision, see infra
notes 106-183 and accompanying text. R
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the “University”).13  Part III details the history of Title IX, the publi-
cations that followed Title IX, and the Department of Education’s
current position on what constitutes a “sport” under Title IX.14
Part IV examines the Second Circuit’s decision in Biediger, focusing
on the determination of whether competitive cheerleading should
be counted as a sport under Title IX.15  Finally, Part V considers the
impact of Biediger on collegiate competitive cheerleading, as well as
recent developments in the fight to have competitive cheerleading
considered a sport.16
II. FACTS
Quinnipiac University is a private university located in Con-
necticut.17  For purposes of athletic competition, the University is a
member of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”),
and competes in NCAA Division I varsity athletics.18  In 2009, Quin-
nipiac University announced plans to eliminate the women’s volley-
ball team along with several smaller men’s sports teams and,
concurrently, announced plans to create a varsity women’s competi-
tive cheerleading team.19  In May 2009, several women’s volleyball
players along with their coach filed suit against Quinnipiac in the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut.20  The
plaintiffs’ primary claim was that as a result of its plans to cut the
women’s volleyball team, Quinnipiac had violated Title IX.21  The
plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent Quinnipiac from elimi-
13. For a more detailed discussion of the parties to the suit and the procedu-
ral history of the case, see infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text. R
14. For a more detailed discussion of Title IX, see infra notes 31-105 and ac- R
companying text.
15. For a detailed narrative of the Second Circuit’s analysis in Biediger III, see
infra notes 106-161 and accompanying text. R
16. For a detailed discussion of critical remarks and the potential impact of
Biediger III, see infra notes 162-207 and accompanying text. R
17. See About Us, QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY, http://www.quinnipiac.edu/about/
(last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (detailing basic facts about academic institution).
18. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D. Conn. 2010),
aff’d, 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Biediger II] (detailing state of athletics
program).
19. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 616 F. Supp. 2d 277, 278 (D. Conn.
2009) [hereinafter Biediger I] (explaining course of events leading to suit).
20. See id. (stating parties to suit); see also Dan Fitzgerald, Quinnipiac Faces Title
IX Lawsuit over Elimination of Women’s Volleyball, CONNECTICUT SPORTS LAW (Apr. 21,
2009), http://ctsportslaw.com/2009/04/21/quinnpiac-faces-title-ix-lawsuit-over-
elimination-of-womens-volleyball/ (reporting filing of suit).
21. See Biediger I, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 279 (describing plaintiff’s claim); see also
Pat Eaton-Robb, Attorneys End Arguments in Quinnipiac Equity Case, USA TODAY (May
14, 2009), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/volleyball/2009-05-14-
1508058890_x.htm (detailing litigation strategy of plaintiffs).
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nating the women’s volleyball team.22  In a pre-trial hearing, the
district court found that the plaintiffs showed the irreparable harm
and likelihood of success on the merits necessary to meet their bur-
den of proof.23  The district court granted the plaintiffs a prelimi-
nary injunction.24
At the close of a bench trial several months later, the district
court granted permanent injunctive relief and found that the Uni-
versity had disproportionately allocated athletic participation op-
portunities.25  The district court explained that for the purposes of
Title IX, the University was prohibited from counting some track
positions multiple times, as cross-country athletes were compelled
to participate in both indoor and outdoor track.26  The district
court also declined to count thirty women’s competitive cheerlead-
ing roster positions, noting that women’s competitive cheerleading
did not yet count as a varsity sport for the purposes of Title IX.27
Once the women’s competitive cheerleading positions and select
track positions were excluded from the total number of available
athletic opportunities, the court found that the disparity between
the positions afforded to men and those afforded to women was not
substantially proportional and, as a result, the University was in vio-
lation of Title IX.28
The University filed an appeal with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit shortly after the decision, challeng-
ing the determination that the University had violated Title IX.29
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s issuance of an in-
junction, holding that the district court was correct in the methods
used to count athletic opportunities for the purpose of Title IX and
that the 3.62% disparity between female enrollment and female
22. See Biediger I, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 279 (discussing plaintiffs’ requested
relief).
23. See id. at 298 (summarizing rationale).
24. See id. (indicating district court decision).
25. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ. (Biediger II), 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 114 (D.
Conn. 2010), aff’d, 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating disposition of district court).
26. See id. at 64 (detailing analysis undertaken to determine number of partic-
ipation opportunities truly available on cross-country, indoor track, and outdoor
track teams).
27. See id. at 101 (rejecting argument that competitive cheerleading met re-
quirements to be considered sport under Title IX).
28. See id. at 112-13 (“Application of OCR’s 1996 Clarification shows that the
3.62 percent disparity is enough to prove that Quinnipiac has not achieved sub-
stantial proportionality and does not fall within the 1979 Policy Interpretation’s
first safe harbor for Title IX compliance.”).
29. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ. (Biediger III), 691 F.3d 85, 96 (2d Cir.
2012) (describing circumstances of appeal).
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athletic opportunities “demonstrated a failure to provide substan-
tially proportionate athletic participation opportunities as required
by Title IX.”30
III. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
On June 23, 1972, Title IX of the Educational Amendments of
1972 was signed into law.31  Title IX’s goal is to prevent sex-based
discrimination within those educational institutions receiving fed-
eral funding.32  Section 901(a) of Title IX provides in relevant part:
“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”33  Originally applicable to
only “educational activities,” in 1974, Title IX’s scope was expanded
to apply to collegiate athletic programs.34
Through its implementing regulations, Title IX further pro-
tects students from discrimination by requiring recipients of federal
financial assistance that are operating or sponsoring “interscholas-
tic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics” to “provide equal
athletic opportunity for members of both sexes.”35  To determine
whether a school is satisfying the equal athletic opportunity man-
date, the Department of Education has set forth a list of factors to
assist in the analysis.36  The list of factors is as follows:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competi-
tion effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of
30. Id. at 108 (summarizing holding).  For further discussion of the district
court’s methods used to count athletic opportunities for the purpose of Title IX,
see infra notes 118-151 and accompanying text. R
31. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2006) (providing United States statutory provi-
sions for discrimination based on sex or blindness).
32. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979) (explaining goal
of Title IX was to “avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory
practices” and “provide individual citizens effective protection against those
practices”).
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006) (providing general prohibition against dis-
crimination, with certain specified exceptions).
34. See J. Brad Reich, All the (Athletes) Are Equal, but Some Are More Equal Than
Others: An Objective Evaluation of Title IX’s Past, Present, and Recommendations for Its
Future, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 525, 530-31 (2003) (discussing applicability of Title IX
to intercollegiate sports through Javits Amendment).
35. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2013) (promulgating mandate for equal athletic
opportunity).
36. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (setting forth factors relevant in making determi-
nation of whether there are equal athletic opportunities for men and women).
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members of both sexes; (2) The provision of equipment
and supplies; (3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance; (5) Opportunity to re-
ceive coaching and academic tutoring; (6) Assignment
and compensation of coaches and tutors; (7) Provision of
locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; (8) Provi-
sion of medical and training facilities and services; (9) Pro-
vision of housing and dining facilities and services; (10)
Publicity.37
These factors force equal athletic opportunity claims into one
of two categories: effective accommodation claims or equal treat-
ment claims.38  An effective accommodation claim occurs where
there is a dispute as to “[w]hether the selection of sports and levels
of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities
of members of both sexes . . . .”39  An equal treatment claim is pre-
sent where there is a dispute as to the allocation of resources such
as equipment, practices, and facilities.40  In the years after Title IX’s
passage, there was significant confusion with respect to its applica-
tion to collegiate athletics, as well as how to maintain compliance.41
As a result, Congress ordered action to clarify the statute and its
requirements.42
1. 1979 Policy Interpretation
In 1979, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
now the Department of Education (“DOE”), issued a policy inter-
pretation that primarily dealt with the meaning of “equal opportu-
37. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (providing list of factors set forth by Department of
Education in its implementing regulations).
38. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ. (Biediger III), 691 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir.
2012) (explaining function of 34 C.F.R. §106.41).  Section 106.41(c)(1) governs
effective accommodation claims, while Sections 106.41(c)(2)-(10) govern equal
treatment claims. See id. (relying on McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of
Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 291 (2d. Cir. 2004)).
39. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (providing first factor considered in determining
whether equal athletic opportunities are available to both sexes).
40. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1)-(10) (listing factors considered in determin-
ing equal treatment).
41. See Brenda L. Ambrosius, Note, Title IX: Creating Unequal Equality Through
Application of the Proportionality Standard in Collegiate Athletics, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 557,
561-62 (2012) (discussing interpretation and application issues).
42. See id. at 561 (describing course of events leading to issuance of 1979 Pol-
icy Interpretation).
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nity” as it applied to intercollegiate athletics.43  Specifically, the
1979 Policy Interpretation articulated three pathways to compliance
with the effective accommodation requirement of Section
106.41(c).44  The three pathways to compliance examine:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportuni-
ties for male and female students are provided in numbers
substantially proportionate to their respective enroll-
ments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are un-
derrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether
the institution can show a history and continuing practice
of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive
to the developing interest and abilities of the members of
that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented
among intercollegiate athletes and the institution cannot
show a continuing practice of program expansion such as
that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the
interests and abilities of the members of that sex have
been fully and effectively accommodated by the present
program.45
This test, known as “the three-part test,” is used to determine
whether there are non-discriminatory athletic opportunities availa-
ble for both sexes.46  An academic institution can comply with Title
IX by ensuring they meet any one of the three prongs of the test.47
2. 1996 Clarification
The Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”),
the department responsible for enforcement of Title IX, made sev-
eral efforts to clarify the requirements and limitations of these
43. See 1979 Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,414 (Dec. 11, 1979)
[hereinafter 1979 Policy Interpretation] (articulating purpose of Policy
Interpretation).
44. See id. (detailing methods of compliance with Title IX).
45. Id. at 71,418 (articulating three-part test).
46. See id. (“In effectively accommodating the interests and abilities of male
and female athletes, institutions must provide both the opportunity for individuals
of each sex to participate in intercollegiate competition . . . .”).
47. See Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and Historical Review
of Forty Legal Developments That Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
325, 340 (2012) (explaining how three-part test ensures compliance with Title IX).
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three options for compliance.48  In 1996, OCR issued a clarification
of the three-part test.49  The 1996 Clarification set forth the follow-
ing three ways for academic institutions to ensure compliance with
Title IX’s regulations.50
Under Prong I of the three-part test, male and female intercol-
legiate level athletic participation opportunities must be “substan-
tially proportionate.”51  To determine whether opportunities are
substantially proportionate, the OCR analysis begins with a determi-
nation of the number of participation opportunities available to
both males and females.52  After ascertaining the number of partici-
pation opportunities, the OCR then compares the numbers on a
case-by-case basis to ensure they are substantially proportionate.53
Factors influencing the determination that participation opportuni-
ties are substantially proportionate include the school’s particular
circumstances and the size of the athletic program.54  Satisfying
Prong I virtually assures compliance with Title IX if adhered to
properly, and has been the method of choice for institutions aim-
ing to maintain compliance.55
Prong II of the three-part test “looks at an institution’s past and
continuing remedial efforts to provide nondiscriminatory participa-
48. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ. (Biediger III), 691 F.3d 85, 96 n.4 (2d Cir.
2012) (summarizing OCR enforcement powers).
49. See Letter from Norma V. Cantu´, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for
Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ., Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The
Three-Part Test (Jan. 16, 1996), available at http://www2.ed.gov/print/about/of-
fices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html [hereinafter 1996 Clarification] (recounting issu-
ance of 1996 Clarification).  The stated purpose of the 1996 Clarification was to
“provides specific factors that guide an analysis of each part of the three-part test.”
Id.
50. See id. (“If an institution has many any part of the three-part test, OCR will
determine that the institution is meeting this requirement.”).
51. 1979 Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418 (reiterating first prong
of test).
52. See 1996 Clarification, supra note 49 (setting forth first step in substantial R
proportionality analysis).  OCR also includes non-scholarship athletes and athletes
who practice but may not compete in determining the number of participation
opportunities. See id. (noting specific position on counting certain athletes).
53. See id. (discussing substantial proportionality guidelines and examples);
see also Andrew J. Weissler, Article, Unasked Questions: Applying Title IX’s Effective
Accommodation Mandate to Interscholastic Athletics, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 71, 86 (2012)
(“[I]t is clear that a deviation of more than a few percentage points is likely to be
fatal to compliance with Benchmark 1.”).
54. See 1996 Clarification, supra note 49 (listing factors that aid in substantial R
proportionality determination).
55. See Jay Larson, Note, All Sports Are Not Created Equal: College Football and a
Proposal to Amend the Title IX Proportionality Prong, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1598, 1606
(2004) (discussing preference of athletic directors to advise compliance through
Prong I).
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tion opportunities through program expansion.”56  To satisfy this
prong, the past actions of the institution must show that it has a
history of being responsive to the “developing interests and abilities
of the underrepresented sex.”57  In addition, the institution must
demonstrate a continuing practice of responding to those develop-
ing interests and abilities.58  Any elimination of sports teams (com-
prised of underrepresented athletes) should occur in the context of
program expansion as a result of changing interests and abilities.59
Prong III of the three-part test asks if the school is “fully and
effectively accommodating the interests and abilities of its students
who are members of the underrepresented sex.”60  Prong III is
comprised of three subparts to address whether a school is fully and
effectively accommodating the underrepresented sex: “(a) whether
there is unmet interest in a particular sport; (b) sufficient ability to
sustain a team in the sport; and (c) reasonable expectation of com-
petition for the team.”61  Interest by the underrepresented sex can
56. 1996 Clarification, supra note 49 (setting forth language of second R
prong).
57. Id. (describing actions required by academic institution).  In addition to
past responsive action, the school must be able to show that they are currently
taking necessary responsive actions. See id. (detailing requirements to which insti-
tution is required to adhere to maintain compliance).  Factors considered to de-
cide if an institution has a history of program expansion include:
[A]n institution’s record of adding intercollegiate teams, or upgrading
teams to intercollegiate status, for the under represented sex; [A]n insti-
tution’s record of increasing the numbers of participants in intercollegi-
ate athletics who are members of the underrepresented sex; and an
institution’s affirmative responses to requests by students or others for
addition or elevation of sports.
Id. (listing factors considered in finding history of program expansion).
58. See id. (detailing requirement of continuing practice of program expan-
sion).  Factors considered to decide if an institution has a continuing practice of
program expansion include:
[A]n institution’s current implementation of a nondiscriminatory policy
or procedure for requesting the addition of sports (including the eleva-
tion of club or intramural teams) and the effective communication of the
policy or procedure to the students; and an institution’s current imple-
mentation of a plan of program expansion that is responsive to develop-
ing interest and abilities.
Id. (listing factors considered in finding continuing practice of program
expansion).
59. See id. (describing procedure for eliminating teams while remaining in
compliance).
60. Id. (setting forth language of Prong III).  Under this prong, students that
are admitted to the institution but have not enrolled are included in the analysis.
See id. (describing which students’ interest and abilities are counted when asking if
school is fully and effectively accommodating interests and abilities of under-
represented sex).
61. Id. (describing sub-parts used to determine if school is in compliance with
Prong III).
9
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take several forms, including: requests to participate in a particular
sport not currently offered, participation in specific club or intra-
mural sports, and “requests that an existing club or intramural
sport be elevated to intercollegiate team status.”62  Sufficient ability
to sustain a team can come from, among other things, the ability of
the students to compete and the opinions of coaches as to the sus-
tainability of a team.63  The reasonable expectation of competition
can be inferred from opportunities to compete against current
competitor schools, as well as other competitive opportunities in
the geographic area surrounding the institution.64
3. 2008 Clarification
With an eye toward ensuring that schools are only counting
genuine athletic opportunities toward participation opportunities,
OCR issued another clarification in 2008, the purpose of which was
to “help institutions determine which intercollegiate or interscho-
lastic athletic activities can be counted for the purpose Title IX
compliance.”65  Specifically, OCR explained that it does not have a
strict definition for “sport.”66  Instead, OCR presumes that an aca-
demic institution’s “established sports” can be counted for the pur-
poses of Title IX, so long as the “university is a member of an
intercollegiate athletic organization, such as the National Collegiate
Athletic Association.”67  If an academic institution is not a member
of an intercollegiate organization, OCR takes up a case-by-case eval-
uation and weighs two sets of factors: 1) the activity’s structure and
administration, and 2) team preparation and competition.68
62. 1996 Clarification, supra note 49 (providing examples of how interest can R
manifest).
63. See id. (describing methods by which ability to sustain team can be found).
64. See id. (iterating examples of evidence to support reasonable expectation
of competition).
65. Letter from Stephanie Monroe, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for
Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ., Athletic Activities Counted for Title IX Compliance (Sept.
17, 2008), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/col-
league-20080917.html [hereinafter 2008 Clarification] (stating purpose of 2008
Clarification).
66. See id. (noting OCR position on “sport” definition).
67. Id. (explaining situation where established sports will be presumed eligi-
ble to be counted under Title IX); see also Ephraim Glatt, Article, Defining “Sport”
Under Title IX: Cheerleading, Biediger v. Quinnipiac University, and the Proper Scope of
Agency Deference, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 297, 305 (2012) (detailing contents of 2008
Compliance Letter); see generally About the NCAA, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/
wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/membership+new (last visited
Dec. 23, 2013) (detailing operation and purpose of NCAA).
68. See 2008 Clarification Letter, supra note 65 (explaining OCR’s analysis R
where school does not belong to intercollegiate athletic organization).
10
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With respect to structure and administration, the following fac-
tors weigh in favor of finding that an activity qualifies as a sport:
whether the budget and staff are under the control of the athletics
department, whether the participants are eligible for athletic schol-
arships, and whether the recruitment methods are the same as
other varsity sports.69  Similarly, regarding team preparation and
competition, OCR considers, among other things, whether the
practice and competition opportunities are similar in quality and
quantity to other varsity sports.70  Notably, OCR also considers
whether the “primary purpose of the activity is to provide athletic
competition at the intercollegiate or interscholastic varsity
levels[.]”71  In short, if the activity qualifies as a “sport” per the 2008
Clarification Letter of Title IX’s implementing regulation, the “par-
ticipants” defined in the 1996 Clarification count towards participa-
tion opportunities for the purposes of Prong I.72
4. OCR’s Position on Cheerleading
As early as 1975, OCR took the position that cheerleading was
presumptively not a sport.73  OCR did not take up the issue again
69. See id. (providing Factor I, which details sub-factors relevant to program
structure and administration).
70. See id. (providing Factor II, which details sub-factors relevant to team
preparation and competition factor).  In addition to regular season competition
opportunities, OCR also inquires into the existence of pre-season and post-season
competition, and compares the existence of such competition to the pre-season
and post-season competition that exists in other varsity sports. See id.
71. Id. (noting primary purpose of activity as factor of importance to OCR
under Factor II).
72. See id. (setting forth analysis undertaken by OCR to determine whether
activity can qualify as “sport” under Title IX); see also 1996 Clarification, supra note
49 (defining which athletes may count as “participant” under Title IX).  Athletes R
are defined in the 1996 Clarification as those athletes:
a. Who are receiving the institutionally-sponsored support normally
provided to athletes competing at the institution involved, e.g., coaching,
equipment, medical and training room services, on a regular basis during
a sport’s season; and
b. Who are participating in organized practice sessions and other team
meetings and activities on a regular basis during a sport’s season; and
c. Who are listed on the eligibility or squad lists maintained for each
sport, or
d. Who, because of injury, cannot meet a, b, or c above but continue to
receive financial aid on the basis of athletic ability.
Id. (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,415).
73. See Letter from Peter E. Holmes, Director, Office for Civil Rights, Dep’t of
Educ., Letter to Chief State School Officers, Title IX Obligations in Athletics (Nov. 11,
1975), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/holmes.html
[hereinafter 1975 OCR Letter] (“[D]rill teams, cheerleaders, and the like, which
are covered more generally as extracurricular activities under section 86.31 . . . are
not part of the institution’s “athletic program” within the meaning of the regula-
11
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until 2000, when it sent two letters to the Executive Director of the
Minnesota State High School League in order to respond to inquir-
ies about what could be classified as a “sport.”74  OCR sent the first
letter in April 2000, in which it specifically cited the 1975 OCR let-
ter and reaffirmed that OCR maintains the presumption that cheer-
leading is not a sport within the meaning of Title IX.75
Only one month later, OCR sent a second letter to the Minne-
sota State High School League in order to clarify its restatement
that cheerleading was presumptively not a sport.76  Specifically,
OCR clarified that its definition of cheerleading included both
competitive and sideline cheer, and that both types of cheerleading
were presumptively not sports for the purposes of Title IX.77  In the
first letter, OCR indicated a willingness to evaluate whether an ac-
tivity is a sport on a case-by-case basis.78  In the second letter, how-
ever, OCR cautioned that in any past instance where cheerleading
or a similar activity was evaluated, it was not found to be a sport for
the purposes of Title IX.79
5. Legal History
One of the first cases in the line of Title IX jurisprudence is
Cannon v. University of Chicago.80  In Cannon, a woman alleged that
she was denied admission to the University of Chicago’s medical
school because of her sex.81  The woman brought a claim under
tion.”).  OCR did not originally distinguish between competitive cheerleading and
the more traditional sideline cheerleading. See id. (noting OCR definition’s lack of
distinction).  Traditional sideline cheerleading primarily involves supporting ath-
letes and entertaining crowds. See Thomas, supra note 7 (describing sideline cheer- R
leading); see also Sean Gregory, Cheer Factor, TIME, Apr. 23, 2012, available at http://
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2111810,00.html (distinguishing
competitive cheerleading event from traditional sideline cheerleading).  Competi-
tive cheerleading is more akin to gymnastics, and usually includes “strenuous tum-
bling runs, human pyramids, back flips, lifts, catches, and tosses.”  Reich, supra
note 34, at 558 (discussing athletic maneuvers competitive cheerleaders perform). R
74. See Paul M. Anderson, Symposium, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and
Historical Review of Forty Legal Developments That Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 325, 363 (2012) (discussing purpose of first letter that was sent on
April 11, 2000).
75. See id. at 364 (reiterating principle articulated in 1975 OCR Letter).
76. See id. (explaining purpose of second letter).
77. See id. (detailing OCR definition of cheerleading).
78. See id. at 363 (explaining OCR policy of evaluation of athletic activities).
79. See id. at 364 (cautioning that after evaluation, cheerleading had never
been deemed sport).
80. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (finding private right
of action under Title IX).  For further discussion of Cannon, see Anderson, supra
note 74, at 335-36 (discussing practical implications of Cannon under Title IX). R
81. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680 (discussing facts of case).
12
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Title IX, but the lower courts dismissed her claim, as they failed to
find a private right of action in the Title IX statute.82  On appeal,
the Supreme Court disagreed and held that there was a private
right of action under Title IX.83  It explained that the failure of
Congress to specifically create a private right of action under Title
IX did not necessarily mean that Congress did not intend for there
to be such a right.84  Following Cannon, not only could wronged
plaintiffs file a complaint with OCR, they could also file a federal
lawsuit.85
After articulating a broad view of Title IX’s applicability in Can-
non, the Supreme Court narrowed the applicability of Title IX in
Grove City College v. Bell.86  In Grove City, the court held that Title IX
applied only to those programs receiving financial aid from the fed-
eral government.87  The court held that because Grove City Col-
lege’s financial aid program received federal financial assistance,
the College’s financial aid program was subject to Title IX.88  This
meant that athletic programs that did not directly receive federal
funds were not subject to Title IX.89  As a result of the decision in
Grove City, many athletic programs were no longer subject to Title
IX regulation.90
In response to the Grove City decision, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Restoration Act, and in doing so, broadened the term
“program or activity” to ensure that receipt of both direct and indi-
rect funds subjected an academic institution to Title IX.91  Prior to
the Civil Rights Restoration Act, “the threshold issue was whether
the actual athletic program received federal funds necessary for Ti-
82. See id. at 683-86 (detailing procedural history).
83. See id. at 709 (“There can be no question but that this . . . analysis supports
the implication of a private federal remedy.”).
84. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (summarizing rationale for holding).
85. See Jill K. Johnson, Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Current Judicial
Interpretation of the Standards for Compliance, 74 B.U. L. REV. 553, 560 (1994) (dis-
cussing implications of Cannon).
86. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (holding that only spe-
cific programs may fall within purview of Title IX).  For further analysis of Grove
City, see Preussel, infra note 96, at 91-92 (discussing effect of Grove City on Title IX R
enforcement).
87. See Grove City, 465 U.S. at 570-71 (discussing program-specific view of
statute).
88. See id. at 573-74 (discussing holding).
89. See Reich, supra note 34, at 534 (discussing impact of Grove City). R
90. See Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title
IX, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 32 (1992) (detailing Grove City’s effect on
athletic programs).
91. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1687 (West 2002) (exhibiting Civil Rights Restoration
Act).
13
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tle IX to apply, or whether receipt by an educational institution or
its students rendered the school as a whole, and all of its programs,
subject to Title IX scrutiny.”92  Following the Civil Rights Restora-
tion Act, if one department within an academic institution received
federal funds, the entire academic institution fell within the pur-
view of Title IX.93
Several years later, the Supreme Court decided Franklin v.
Gwinnet County Public Schools, and provided some guidance on the
remedies that courts could award.94  The Supreme Court in Frank-
lin held that “absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the
federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a
cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute.”95
This expanded the relief available under Title IX from mere equita-
ble relief to any relief the court deems appropriate, including but
not limited to damages and attorney’s fees.96
The landmark case in the progression of Title IX has been Co-
hen v. Brown University.97  In Cohen, a class action suit was brought
against Brown University for its decision to demote the women’s
volleyball and gymnastics teams from varsity teams to intercollegiate
club sports.98  The district court found that Brown University had
failed all three prongs of the test.99  The First Circuit affirmed the
92. Heckman, supra note 90, at 29 (discussing question academic institutions R
struggled with after passage of Title IX).
93. See id. at 33 (explaining corrective nature of Civil Rights Restoration Act).
94. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1992) (dis-
cussing practical repercussions of holding).
95. Id.
96. See Robin M. Preussel, Article, Successful Challenge, Ruling Reversed: Why the
Office of Civil Rights’ Survey Proposal May Be Well-Intentioned but Misguided, 13 SPORTS
LAW. J. 79, 92 (2006) (reporting effect of Franklin holding).
97. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (clarifying methods of
compliance).  For further discussion of Cohen, see Preussel, supra note 96, at 92-95 R
(discussing implications of Cohen).
98. See Cohen, 101 F.3d at 161 (describing facts of case).
99. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 991-93 (D.R.I. 1992), aff’d,
991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing University’s failure to satisfy all three
prongs).  The court found the University did not meet Prong I because the athletic
participation opportunities offered by the University were not substantially propor-
tionate. See id. at 991 (finding failure to meet Prong I).  With respect to the first
prong, the court found that the makeup of the undergraduate student population
(51.8% male and 48.2% female) was not substantially proportionate to the num-
ber of athletic participation opportunities (63.4% male and 36.6% female). See id.
(explaining significance of disparity).  The court found that the University failed
Prong II of the test because it had demonstrated past practice of program expan-
sion, but could not demonstrate a continuing practice of program expansion. See
id. (finding failure to meet Prong II).  Finally, the court found that the denial of
full varsity status to women’s volleyball and gymnastics meant that the University
was not accommodating the interests and abilities of its women athletes. See id. at
14
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district court opinion, noting specifically that failing to meet Prong
I of the three-part test does not necessarily mean the institution is
violating the effective accommodation provision of Section
106.41(c)(1); for a violation to occur, the institution must fail all
three parts of the test.100  Following logically from this assertion,
the court recognized that the University could comply with Title IX
if any one of the three prongs was satisfied.101  Finally, the court
explained that the three-part test should be treated as a rebuttable
presumption.102  One author explains, “If a school could demon-
strate substantial proportionality, it complied with Title IX.  If not,
it could attempt to comply under either of the remaining two
prongs.”103
Courts have repeatedly tracked the same analysis as Cohen and
have affirmed its holding repeatedly since it was decided.104
Though the 1996 Clarification seems to reaffirm Cohen’s holding
that a school need only satisfy one of the three prongs of the three-
part test to maintain compliance, the majority of academic institu-
tions continue to use the substantial proportionality test as the
benchmark for compliance.105
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The Second Circuit first took up the issue of the standard of
review for the district court’s decision.106  On appeal, Quinnipiac
University challenged the district court’s declaratory judgment that
it was engaging in sex discrimination under Title IX and argued for
the reversal of the district court’s grant of permanent injunctive re-
lief.107  The circuit court held that although it did not normally
991-92.  The court held that the failure to accommodate violated Prong III. See id.
(noting failure to meet Prong III).
100. See Johnson, supra note 85, at 574 (describing operation of three-part
test).
101. See Reich, supra note 34, at 535 (discussing court’s analysis of compliance R
under three-part test).
102. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 171 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussing
court’s opinion on function of three-part test).
103. Reich, supra note 34, at 536 (examining methods of compliance). R
104. See Preussel, supra note 96, at 95 (discussing line of cases that followed R
Cohen).
105. See Tshaka C. Randall, Comment, A (Not So) Safe Harbor: Substantial Pro-
portionality as a Measure of Effective Accommodation, 5 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 79,
92 (2003) (explaining that most schools use first prong as safe harbor).
106. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ. (Biediger III), 691 F.3d 85, 96 (2d Cir.
2012) (presenting threshold issue of standard of review).
107. See id. at 96 (setting forth University’s argument).
15
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have the discretion to review declaratory judgments, because the
declaratory judgment was “inextricably intertwined” with the grant
of permanent injunctive relief, the circuit court had jurisdiction in
this case.108  Further, the court explained that because the Univer-
sity only challenged the legal and factual basis of the injunction,
rather than the scope of the relief, the court was only allowed to
review the factual findings for clear error, but conclusions of law
could be reviewed de novo.109
B. Deference to the Department of Education
The circuit court then turned to the high level of deference
afforded to the policy interpretations and implementing regula-
tions of Title IX.110  The court relied on McCormick ex rel. McCormick
v. School District of Mamaroneck to demonstrate that Congress dele-
gated the policy-making duties underlying Title IX to the DOE.111
The court next cited Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. to show that as a result of the delegation, the high de-
gree of judicial deference to OCR was warranted.112  The court also
relied on Auer v. Robbins and found that the 1979 Policy Interpreta-
tion, 1996 Clarification, and the 2000 and 2008 OCR Letters were
all entitled to “substantial deference.”113
The court then moved on to discuss the content of the OCR
policy interpretations in the context of the University’s litigation
strategy.114  It observed first that OCR has explained that having
separate teams based on sex is permitted, so long as both sexes are
given equal opportunity.115  The court noted that the plaintiffs’ ar-
gument was, in short, that the participation opportunities afforded
108. See id. (explaining standard under which jurisdiction is proper).
109. See id. (discussing proper standards of review for review of lower court
decision).
110. See id. at 96-97 (summarizing issue of deference to Department of
Education).
111. See id. at 96 (citing McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of
Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 288 (2d Cir. 2004)).
112. See id. at 96-97 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
113. Id. (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (affording defer-
ence to Department Secretary’s interpretation of Department of Labor
regulation)).
114. See id. at 98-99 (discussing University’s choice to defend only one of two
claims on appeal).
115. See id. at 98 (referencing 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b)).  Section 106.41(b) per-
mits institution to maintain separate teams for members of each sex “where selec-
tion for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a
contact sport.”  34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).  Section 106.41(c) mandates that equal op-
portunity be provided for both sexes in sports. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (“A recipi-
16
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to women were not equal under both Prong I and Prong III of the
three-part test.116  The court then explained that although the
plaintiffs had put forth claims under Prong I and III of the three-
part test, the University chose to defend the Prong I claim, the sub-
stantial proportionality of its athletics program.117
C. Review of District Court’s Analysis of Athletic Participation
Opportunities Afforded to Women
The court next addressed the question of the number of ath-
letic participation opportunities afforded to women.118  First, the
Second Circuit noted that the Plaintiffs’ claim was an effective ac-
commodation claim under Section 106.41(c)(1).119  As such, the
court explained that the proper analysis under Section
106.41(c)(1) was to apply the three-part test articulated in the 1979
Policy Interpretation and the 1996 Clarification.120  Per the 1996
Clarification, the court explained that the first step in the analysis is
to accurately determine the number of participation opportunities
afforded to male and female athletes.121  The plaintiffs argued that
the women’s cross-country, indoor track, and outdoor track roster
positions should not count as fifty-four participation opportunities
as the eighteen team members each held a place on all three
teams.122  The court noted that per the 1996 Clarification, if an ath-
lete participates in more than one sport, he or she is counted as a
participant in each sport.123  The issue for the court, however, was
ent which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural
athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes.”).
116. See Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 98 (explaining Plaintiffs’ arguments that ath-
letic opportunities available to women were neither substantially proportionate to
enrollment, nor fully and effectively accommodating female student population’s
interests and abilities).
117. See id. (discussing litigation strategy of University).
118. See id. at 99-102 (detailing calculation of participation opportunities af-
forded to women).
119. See id. at 92 (explaining category of Plaintiffs’ claim).  For a more de-
tailed explanation of the distinction between an effective accommodation claim
and an equal treatment claim under Section 106.41(c), see supra notes 38-40 and R
accompanying text.
120. See Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 93 (explaining first step in analysis).  For a
more detailed discussion of the 1979 Policy Interpretation, 1996 Clarification, and
three-part test generally, see supra notes 43-64 and accompanying text. R
121. See Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 93 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (describing analysis needed to make determination with respect to
number of opportunities available).
122. See id. at 99 (detailing argument of Plaintiffs with respect to participation
opportunities on cross-country team, indoor track team, and outdoor track team).
123. See id. (discussing policy weighing in favor or finding that fifty-four ath-
letic participation opportunities should be counted as genuine).
17
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that the women cross-country runners were being forced to partici-
pate in all three sports.124
The court affirmed the district court’s finding that the sixty
positions available on the University’s indoor and outdoor track
teams “were not reflective of genuine participation opportunities in
these sports, but were inflated to afford mandated year-round train-
ing for eighteen members of the women’s cross-country team.”125
The court found persuasive the district court’s reasoning that the
five indoor track team positions and the six outdoor track team po-
sitions that were being filled by injured or otherwise ineligible ath-
letes were in fact illusory.126  As a result of this finding, the circuit
court held that the total athletic participation opportunities among
women’s cross-country, indoor track, and outdoor track was sixty-
seven participants, as opposed to the University’s proffered seventy-
eight.127
D. Competitive Cheerleading as a Sport Under Title IX
In order to complete the calculation of the available athletic
opportunities, the circuit court then dealt with the issue of whether
women’s competitive cheerleading constituted a “sport” for the
purposes of Title IX.128  For the positions on the competitive cheer-
leading team to be counted as participation opportunities, the activ-
ity must be considered a sport under Title IX.129  The district court
124. See id. (highlighting fact that runners were being compelled to partici-
pate as signal to court of potential problem).  Notably, the men’s cross-country
team members were not required to do the same. See id. (recognizing distinction
between men’s and women’s cross country team requirements).
125. Id. at 100 (finding participation opportunities were not genuine).
126. See id. at 100-01 (observing that injured and red-shirted athletes could
not be counted multiple times as participation opportunities).
127. See id. at 100 (noting reduction in number of genuine participation op-
portunities).  The University came to a number of seventy-eight based on the thirty
positions available on both indoor and outdoor track, combined with the eighteen
positions on the women’s cross country team. See id. at 98-101 (discussing gener-
ally number of participation opportunities).  The University attempted to chal-
lenge this ruling by claiming it was denied due process “by lack of notice that the
question of whether injured and red-shirted cross-country runners were afforded
genuine athletic participation opportunities in indoor and outdoor track was at
issue.” Id. at 101 (setting forth additional argument by University).  The court
rejected the University’s argument, as well as the argument that the University
lacked notice that mandating cross-country runners to participate in indoor and
outdoor track would be looked upon negatively. See id. (describing arguments
court found unpersuasive).
128. See id. at 102-05 (describing analysis of whether competitive cheerleading
is sport under Title IX).
129. See 2008 Clarification, supra note 65 (“OCR evaluates the opportunities R
provided by the institution’s intercollegiate or interscholastic ‘sports.’”).  For a
more detailed discussion of how OCR determines if an activity is a sport and an
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concluded that competitive cheerleading was not a sport for the
purposes of Title IX, and the circuit court reaffirmed.130
First, as a threshold matter, the court distinguished between
sideline cheerleading and competitive cheerleading and noted that
the University’s team is a competitive cheerleading team.131  The
court next pointed out that neither the Department of Education
nor the NCAA has ever recognized competitive cheerleading as a
sport.132  The court then reviewed the lower court’s application of
the 2008 Compliance Letter to the facts of the case.133  The district
court found that although the competitive cheerleading team’s
structure, administration, team preparation, and competition was
similar to other varsity teams, it was distinguishable enough that it
could not be considered a varsity sport for the purposes of Title
IX.134
Specifically, the court explained, “competitive cheerleading
was generally structured and administered by Quinnipiac’s athletics
department in a manner consistent with the school’s other varsity
teams.”135  The court also agreed with the district court finding that
the team’s preparation—including “practice time, regimen, and
venue”—was similar to that of other varsity sports.136  The court
took note of the district court’s finding that the competitive oppor-
tunities—including the number of competitions, the length of the
season, and the presence of a governing body that dictated the
competitive schedule—were similar to other varsity sports.137  Fi-
nally, the court noted the district court’s finding that the purpose
examination of the 2008 Clarification, see supra notes 65-72 and accompanying R
text.
130. See Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 105 (citing Biediger II, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 101,
aff’d, 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012) (summarizing holding of district court)).
131. See id. at 102-03 (discussing distinction between sideline and competitive
cheerleading).
132. See id. at 103 (pointing out competitive cheerleading’s lack of recogni-
tion by NCAA and DOE as sport).  The NCAA has yet to declare competitive cheer-
leading as even an “emerging sport,” the precursor to “sport” designation under
NCAA standards. Id. (noting lack of NCAA “emerging sport” definition).  For a
more detailed discussion of the recent effort to add competitive cheerleading to
the list of emerging sports, see infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text. R
133. See Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 103 (examining district court analysis).
134. See id. at 104-05 (summarizing findings of district court).
135. Id. at 103 (internal citation omitted) (discussing 2008 OCR Letter’s ap-
plication to structure and administration of competitive cheerleading program).
136. See id. at 103-04 (internal citation omitted) (discussing competitive
cheerleading team’s preparation).
137. Id. at 104 (observing recent creation of NCATA).  For a more detailed
discussion of the NCATA and NCATA’s role in Emerging Sport Proposal, see infra
notes 194-202 and accompanying text. R
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of competitive cheerleading was competition, also like many other
varsity sports.138
Despite the evidence weighing in favor of classifying competi-
tive cheerleading as a sport for the purposes of Title IX, the court
identified characteristics that set competitive cheerleading apart
from other sports: the lack of recruitment efforts, the lack of a uni-
form set of rules that led to competition between varsity and non-
varsity competitors, and irregularities in season and post-season
competition.139  The court noted that, unlike other varsity sports,
the University did not recruit competitive cheerleaders off-campus
during the 2009-2010 season.140  Additionally, the Second Circuit
found it important that “no uniform set of rules applied to the
cheerleading competition throughout the 2009-2010 season.”141
Moreover, the court gave weight to the fact that the University’s
competitive cheerleading team competed against both varsity and
non-varsity competitors.142  The Second Circuit supported the dis-
trict court’s reasoning that uniform rules and solely varsity oppo-
nents are “touchstones of a varsity sports program” that ensure fair
play and allow teams to be “distinguished in terms of quality.”143
Finally, the court found that the post-season play the team engaged
in was too different from other varsity sports.144  Specifically, the
court found that lack of a “progressive playoff system leading to a
championship game. . .did not conform to expectations for a varsity
sport.”145  As those facets of competitive cheerleading’s competition
structure were distinguishable from other varsity sports, the circuit
138. Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 104 (concluding purpose to be intercollegiate
varsity level competition).
139. See id. at 104-05 (listing characteristics that differentiate competitive
cheerleading from other varsity sports).
140. See id. at 104 (“Quinnipiac did not – and, in 2009-10, could not – con-
duct any off-campus recruitment for its competitive cheerleading team, in marked
contrast to not only the school’s other varsity sports teams but also to a typical
NCAA Division I sports program.”).
141. Id. (“[I]n the ten competitions in which the Quinnipiac team partici-
pated during the regular season, it was judged according to five different scoring
systems.”).
142. See id. (describing types of teams against whom team competed as club
teams, sideline cheerleading teams, and all-star teams).
143. Id. (analyzing benefits of competition against exclusively varsity competi-
tors using uniform rules).
144. See  Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 104-05 (discussing type of championship
wherein team competed).
145. Id. (explaining that instead, competitive cheerleading team participated
in “an open invitational, which neither excluded any team on the basis of its regu-
lar season performance nor ranked or seeded participating teams on that basis”).
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court agreed with the district court’s finding that cheerleading was
not yet a sport for the purposes of Title IX.146
The University challenged the weight to which the district
court assigned the factors that influenced the finding that competi-
tive cheerleading was not a varsity sport.147  The Second Circuit re-
jected the University’s challenge and noted that significant
discretion is given to the lower court to decide the weight a particu-
lar factor should be given.148  Deference to the lower court aside,
the circuit court noted that it agreed with the analysis of the district
court, and that:
Even assuming that de novo review were warranted, we con-
clude for the same reasons stated in detail by the district
court and summarized in this opinion, that . . . the bal-
ance tips decidedly against finding competitive cheerlead-
ing to presently be a ‘sport’ whose participation
opportunities should be counted for purposes of Title
IX.149
The court did note that in the future, competitive cheerlead-
ing may meet the requirements to be considered a varsity sport, but
“that time has not yet arrived.”150  As a result of the determination
that competitive cheerleading was not yet a sport under Title IX,
the University’s athletic participation opportunities were reduced
by a total of forty-one.151
E. Substantial Proportionality
After finding that the University had forty-one fewer athletic
participation opportunities for women than the University thought
it had, the court affirmed the district court’s finding that 233 of the
University’s 400 varsity athletic participation opportunities, or
146. See id. (presenting possibility of varsity sport designation if activity is bet-
ter organized and begins to play by defined, uniformly applied rules).
147. See id. at 105 (describing University’s argument).
148. See id. (“We generally accord considerable discretion to a factfinder in
deciding what weight to assign competing evidence pointing toward different
conclusions.”).
149. Id. (rejecting University’s argument that circuit court should decide how
much weight to give factors weighing for and against finding competitive cheer-
leading to be sport under Title IX).
150. Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 105 (citing Biediger II, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 101, aff’d,
691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012)).
151. See id. at 105-06 (noting total athletic participation opportunities elimi-
nated among cross-country and competitive cheerleading participants).
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58.25%, belonged to women.152  Given that females then made up
61.87% of the undergraduate population, the court noted that a
3.62% disparity existed between the athletic opportunities available
to men versus those available to women.153  The Second Circuit
found that the 3.62% disparity “demonstrated that Quinnipiac was
not affording substantially proportionate varsity athletic participa-
tion opportunities to its female students.”154
The University challenged the determination that the 3.62%
disparity in athletic opportunities was not substantially proportional
on two grounds.155  First, the University argued that 3.62% was “too
small to support such a finding.”156  Second, the University argued
that the increase in female undergraduate enrollment that partially
accounted for the disparity was out of its control.157  The circuit
court did not find the University’s challenge persuasive for two
main reasons.158  First, the court explained that the University’s reli-
ance on the exact percentage of the disparity was unnecessary be-
cause, per the 1996 Clarification, “substantial proportionality is not
determined by any bright-line statistical test.”159  Second, the circuit
court pointed out that, as the district court discovered, the disparity
was primarily the result of the University’s intentional roster manip-
ulation.160  Having determined that the 3.62% disparity was suffi-
cient to find a lack of substantial proportionality, the court affirmed
the district court’s determination that the University had violated
Title IX.161
152. See id. at 106 (calculating percentage of female enrollment and female
athletic participation opportunities).
153. See id. (analyzing percentage disparity between female enrollment and
female athletic participation opportunities).
154. Id. at 108 (summarizing holding of circuit court with respect to substan-
tial proportionality).
155. See id. at 106-07 (presenting crux of University’s argument).
156. Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 106 (arguing percent difference between female
enrollment and female varsity athletic participation opportunities to be too slight).
157. See id. at 107 (“[The University] submits that the district court erred in
holding Quinnipiac responsible for the disparity in light of fluctuations in
enrollment . . . .”).
158. See id. at 106-07 (describing two reasons University’s argument was
unpersuasive).
159. Id. at 106 (“[W]e do not, in any event, understand the 1996 Clarification
to create a statistical safe harbor at [2%] or any other percentage.”).
160. See id. at 106-07 (“[T]he 3.62% identified disparity was almost entirely
attributable to Quinnipiac’s own careful control of its athletic rosters.”).
161. See id. at 108 (“Accordingly, we reject Quinnipiac’s challenge to the dis-
trict court’s finding that the school engaged in sex discrimination in violation of
Title IX, and we affirm the order enjoining Quinnipiac from continuing such
discrimination.”).
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V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit’s conclusion with respect to whether com-
petitive cheerleading should be considered a sport under Title IX
was warranted based not only on the state of the University’s pro-
gram, but on the state of the sport generally.162  The court identi-
fied three main characteristics that set competitive cheerleading
apart from other sports: the lack of recruitment efforts, the lack of a
uniform set of rules and competitors, and irregularities in season
and post-season competition.163
Turning to the first characteristic, the court correctly found it
relevant that the University’s cheerleading team did not conduct
the same type of recruitment as typical NCAA Division I pro-
grams.164  Most large schools with Division I programs conduct
large-scale recruitments for many sports.165  For example, NCAA Di-
vision I Men’s Basketball recruits each get to visit five college cam-
puses, with the academic institution footing the bill for the recruit
and one of his or her parents.166  Competitive cheerleading is not
recognized as a sport by the NCAA, so even those academic institu-
tions that are members of the NCAA cannot recruit competitive
cheerleaders in the same manner that they recruit athletes for
other sports.167  Moreover, because many schools designate com-
petitive cheerleading as a club or intramural sport, the financial
benefits available to recruits for other sports are simply unavailable
to competitive cheerleaders.168
162. For a more detailed discussion of the differences in competitive opportu-
nities, scoring systems, varsity designations, and a general discussion of how com-
petitive cheerleading differs from other varsity sports, see infra notes 164-183 and R
accompanying text.
163. See Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 104-05 (listing characteristics that differentiate
competitive cheerleading from other varsity sports).
164. See id. at 104 (discussing inability to recruit new competitive
cheerleaders).
165. See Allie Grasgreen, Hands-Off Approach to NCAA Rules, INSIDEHIGHERED.
COM (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/01/21/division-
i-trims-rulebook-deregulates-recruiting (providing examples of recruiting rules).
166. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Basketball Recruiting Rule Change Effective Fri-
day, NCAA (Jun. 11, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/
NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2012/June/Basketball+recruiting+rule+change+
effective+Friday [hereinafter Brutlag Hosick 1] (describing recruiting efforts al-
lowed under NCAA rules).
167. See Liam Migdail-Smith, Competitive Cheerleading Fans Push NCAA for Offi-
cial Recognition as a Sport, PENNLIVE.COM (Jan. 29, 2011), http://www.pennlive.
com/midstate/index.ssf/2011/01/competitive-cheerleading_fans.html (discuss-
ing current lack of designation as sport under NCAA and petition asking NCAA to
grant cheerleading emerging sport designation).
168. See Drehs, supra note 3 (“There are no scholarships.  No free books.  No R
on-site trainer.  Not even early registration to schedule classes around practices.
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With respect to the second characteristic, the court also cor-
rectly found that neither the rules governing cheerleading competi-
tion and the competitors against whom the University was
competing were not all uniform.169  Though the University partici-
pated in all-varsity competitions through the National Competitive
Acrobatics and Tumbling Association (“NCATA”) during the 2009-
2010 season, they also participated in other competitions wherein
the competitors were not all varsity teams.170  Notably, Quinnipiac
University’s team was not the only NCATA member-team compet-
ing against non-varsity competitors during the 2009 and 2010
seasons.171
Even if the Second Circuit had conducted its own review of the
issue, it would likely have made similar findings based on the state
of competitive cheerleading during the 2009 and 2010 seasons.172
Only a small number of colleges and universities maintain varsity
competitive cheerleading programs, although many have coined
them “acrobatics and tumbling” teams.173  Many other schools
maintain their teams as club or intramural sports, rendering the
team members ineligible to receive any of the benefits other NCAA-
sanctioned sports teams would receive.174  Despite the variation in
Most cheerleaders need jobs to support themselves, a rules violation for athletes of
NCAA-sanctioned sports.”).
169. See Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 104 (explaining that Quinnipiac “was chal-
lenged by a motley assortment of competitors.” (citation omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
170. See Biediger II, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 82-83, aff’d, 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012)
(discussing types of opponents team faced).  The University’s competitive cheer-
leading team competed in both NCATA meets and outside competitions, such as
the NCA Cheerleading Championship. See id. (providing evidence that team com-
peted against all types of competitors).
171. See, e.g., 2010 Schedule/Results Azusa Pacific Acrobatics & Tumbling, AZUSA
PACIFIC ATHLETICS, http://www.apu.edu/athletics/acrobatics/schedule/2010/
(last visited Dec. 21, 2013) [hereinafter 2010 Azusa Schedule] (detailing competi-
tion schedule for 2009-2010 season); University of Oregon Acrobatics & Tumbling –
2009-10 Schedule, GODUCKS.COM, http://www.goducks.com/SportSelect.dbml?SP-
SID=105365&SPID=11402&DB_OEM_ID=500&Q_SEASON=2009 (last visited Dec.
23, 2013) [hereinafter 2009-2010 Oregon Schedule] (exhibiting competition
schedule for 2009-2010 season).
172. See Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 105 (explaining Quinnipiac’s argument for de
novo review and court’s rejection of same).
173. See Liz Clarke, Title IX Anniversary: Maryland Cuts Cheerleading, but Was It
Ever a Sport?, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-
04-13/sports/35453053_1_neena-chaudhry-female-athletes-title-ix (noting name
change from competitive cheerleading to acrobatics and tumbling); see also Baylor
Bears Acrobatics & Tumbling, BAYLORBEARS.COM, http://www.baylorbears.com/
sports/w-acro/bay-w-acro-body.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2013) (exhibiting team
name).
174. See Drehs, supra note 3 (explaining choice of many academic institutions R
to designate competitive cheerleading with club or intramural status and effect on
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designations, some competitions, including the National Cheer-
leaders Association (“NCA”) Cheerleading Championship, allow all
types of competitive cheerleading teams, including both varsity and
clubs teams, to compete.175  The varied organizations that host the
competitions that Quinnipiac, as well as other schools competed in,
all used their own distinct set of rules for competition and scor-
ing.176  Given the state of varsity competitive cheerleading during
the 2009-2010 competition season, the circuit court was correct in
finding a lack of a uniform rule system and, in turn, all-varsity
competition.177
Finally, turning to the third characteristic, the court was cor-
rect in determining that during the 2009-2010 season, there was no
uniformity with respect to a post-season and that the lack of uni-
formity in the post-season was quite different from other varsity
sports.178  The lack of a post-season undoubtedly separates competi-
tive cheerleading from other varsity sports.179  For example, men’s
basketball teams from NCAA member schools compete in a pro-
gressive, single elimination playoff system during March and April
every year (popularly known as “March Madness” or the “Final
Four”).180  Additionally, college football holds the Bowl Champion-
ship Series every year and starting in 2015, NCAA college football
will adopt a four-team college football playoff format in lieu of the
current national championship game.181  For the few varsity com-
athletes who participate); see also VIRGINIA TECH COMPETITIVE CHEERLEADING,
http://www.vtcompetitivecheerleading.com/Home_Page.html (last visited Dec.
21, 2013) (exhibiting club sport status).
175. See NCA & NDA Competition Rule Book for College Teams, NCA & NDA COL-
LEGIATE CHEER AND DANCE CHAMPIONSHIP, at 12 (2013), available at http://nca.
varsity.com/pdfs/college_rule_book.pdf (providing that both varsity and club
cheerleading teams may be eligible for NCA competition).
176. See Biediger II, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 84, aff’d, 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012)
(providing chart showing different rule systems are used during competition
season).
177. See Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 104 (restating finding of both varsity and non-
varsity competitors).
178. See id. at 104-05 (finding team competed in open invitational rather than
more traditional progressive playoff system).
179. For examples of college sports that conduct post-season tournaments,
see infra notes 180-181 and accompanying text. R
180. See 2013 NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship Bracket, NCAA, http://www.
ncaa.com/interactive-bracket/basketball-men/d1 (last visited Dec. 23, 2013) (ex-
hibiting results from progressive playoff system for used during 2013 NCAA basket-
ball post-season).
181. See David L. Ricci, Article, The Worst Form of Championship, Except for All of
the Others That Have Been Tried: Analyzing the Potential Anti-Trust Vulnerability of the
Bowl Championship Series, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 541, 541-42 (2012) (discussing
merits and popular criticisms of previous format of Bowl Championship Series);
Brett McMurphy, Sites of 2016, 2017 Title Games Set, ESPN (Dec. 16, 2013, 8:11 PM),
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petitive cheerleading teams in existence during the 2009-2010 sea-
son, the “post-season” was limited to participation in the NCA
Cheerleading Championship, which does not rank teams by
merit.182  It seems clear the Second Circuit was correct in determin-
ing that for the 2009-2010 season, Quinnipiac’s competitive cheer-
leading team did not participate in a meaningful post-season, thus
distinguishing it from other varsity sports.183
VI. IMPACT
The Second Circuit’s decision in Biediger reaffirmed that com-
petitive cheerleading was not a sport under Title IX at the time, but
in doing so, articulated with specificity what exactly distinguished it
from varsity sports.184  Perhaps Biediger should not be seen as a set-
back, but as more of a blueprint for how to bring competitive
cheerleading within the purview of Title IX.185
NCATA and its member teams seem to have a similar view, as
many of the issues that led the lower court to find that competitive
cheerleading was not yet ready to be considered a sport under Title
IX have since been resolved.186  For example, one of the key issues
for the court was that competitors against which the University’s
team was competing were not all varsity.187  As for the 2012-2013
season, all five of the varsity teams currently in existence were com-
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/10147406/arizona-tampa-flor-
ida-land-2016-2017-college-football-national-championship-games (“AT&T Sta-
dium in Arlington, Texas, was announced in April [2013] as the site of the title
game in 2015, the first year the NCAA moves to the four-team College Football
Playoff.”).
182. See, e.g., Biediger II, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 82-83, aff’d, 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir.
2012) (providing schedule that shows team competed at NCA Cheerleading Cham-
pionship); 2009-2010 Azusa Schedule, supra note 171 (providing second example R
of varsity team participation in NCA Cheerleading Championship as sole post-sea-
son activity); 2009-2010 Oregon Schedule, supra note 171 (providing third exam- R
ple of varsity team participation in NCA Cheerleading Championship as sole of
post-season activity).
183. See Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 104-05 (summarizing finding of lack of tradi-
tional playoff-style post-season activities).
184. See id. (listing characteristics that distinguished competitive cheerleading
from other sports).
185. See id. (“[W]e do not foreclose the possibility, that the activity, with better
organization and defined rules, might some day warrant recognition as a varsity
sport.”).
186. For a further discussion of the recent changes made to competitive
cheerleading structure following the district court decision, see infra notes 187-190 R
and accompanying text.
187. See Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 104 (reiterating concern of Second Circuit
that lack of all-varsity competition distinguished competitive cheerleading from
other varsity sports).
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peting through NCATA exclusively against varsity competitors.188
The result of the exclusive participation in NCATA competitions is
that all the varsity teams are competing according to the same scor-
ing system, eliminating the second of three problems on which the
Biediger court focused.189  Finally, with respect to the lack of a post-
season, NCATA has responded by creating its own championship
series with a single-elimination system.190
As recently as March of 2013, the district court reaffirmed that
despite the above developments, the Quinnipiac program is still not
similar enough to the University’s other sports to be considered a
varsity sport for the purposes of Title IX.191  The court explained
that the fact that the NCAA still does not recognize the activity as an
Emerging Sport “tip[s] the balance against treating an athletic en-
deavor as an authentic varsity ‘sport’ for purposes of prong one.”192
It would seem then, that following this most recent ruling, that
NCAA Emerging Sport designation is essential to finding that com-
188. See 2012 Schedule/Results Azusa Pacific Acrobatics & Tumbling, AZUSA PA-
CIFIC ATHLETICS, http://www.apu.edu/athletics/acrobatics/schedule/2012/ (last
visited Dec. 23, 2013) (detailing competition schedule for 2012-2013 season); Uni-
versity of Oregon Acrobatics & Tumbling – 2012-13 Schedule, GODUCKS.COM, http://
www.goducks.com/SportSelect.dbml?SPSID=105365&SPID=11402&DB_OEM_ID=
500&Q_SEASON=2012 (providing 2012-2013 competition schedule); Quinnipiac
University Acrobatics & Tumbling 2012-13 Schedule, WWW.QUINNIPIACBOBCATS.COM,
http://www.quinnipiacbobcats.com/sports/gymnastics/2012-13/schedule (last
visited Dec. 23, 2013) (providing 2012-2013 competition schedule); Baylor Bears
Acrobatics & Tumbling 2013 Schedule, BAYLORBEARS.COM, http://www.baylorbears.
com/sports/w-acro/sched/bay-w-acro-sched.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2013) (pro-
viding 2012-2013 competition schedule); see also Fairmont State University Acrobatics
& Tumbling 2013-2014 Schedule, FIGHTINGFALCONS.COM, http://www.fightingfal-
cons.com/acrobatic/schedule/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2013) (providing 2013-2014
competition schedule).
189. See Scoring, NCATA, http://thencata.org/competition/scoring/ (last vis-
ited Dec. 23, 2013) (discussing basic format of scoring system).  The court was
concerned with the lack of fairness and the inability to compare teams that accom-
panied the use of several different scoring systems. See Biediger III, 691 F.3d at 104
(taking issue with lack of uniform application of one set of rules).
190. See Championship Format, NCATA, http://thencata.org/competition/
qualification/championship-format/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2013) (providing basic
information about competition).
191. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., No. 3:09-CV-621 (SRU), 2013 WL
789612, at *3-7 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2013) (discussing changes to University’s team).
192. Id. at *33 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2013) (“So long as acknowledged authorities
in intercollegiate athletics decline to recognize acro as an authentic varsity sport,
courts should hesitate before doing otherwise.  For this reason alone, I conclude
that Quinnipiac has failed to overcome the presumption against treating acro as a
varsity “sport” for purposes of Title IX.”).  For a further discussion of what consti-
tutes an “Emerging Sport,” see infra notes 196-197 and accompanying text. R
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petitive cheerleading is a sport for the purposes of Title IX, at least
within the District of Connecticut.193
The fact that competitive cheerleading is still not considered a
sport cannot be attributed to lack of effort.194  In 2010, the NCAA
was asked by two competing organizations, USA Cheerleading and
USA Gymnastics, to consider adding competitive cheerleading to
the list of Emerging Sports for Women.195  USA Cheerleading and
USA Gymnastics submitted distinct proposals for STUNT and Acro-
batics and Tumbling, respectively, to be added to the list of Emerg-
ing Sports for Women.196  To be considered an Emerging Sport, at
least twenty varsity teams must be in existence at colleges and uni-
versities around the country and the NCAA must receive ten letters
of commitment from academic institutions that already maintain
the sport or plan to create the sport.197
As of this writing, the NCAA has requested additional informa-
tion relating to several different elements of the function of the
sport, but has not yet made a determination on whether to add
competitive cheer to the list of Emerging Sports for Women.198
193. See Biediger, 2013 WL 789612, at *33 (announcing lack of NCAA recog-
nition of competitive cheer as sport as sole purpose for holding competitive cheer-
leading, or “acro” to not yet be sport under Title IX).
194. For a further discussion of the efforts to have competitive cheerleading
considered a sport, see infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text. R
195. See Erin Skarda, Will Competitive Cheerleading Become the Next NCAA-Sanc-
tioned Sport?, TIME, May 24, 2011, available at http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/05/
24/will-competitive-cheerleading-become-the-next-ncaa-sanctioned-sport/ (dis-
cussing both proposals and organizations that submitted them); see also Michelle
Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Committee Asks for Collaboration in New Sport, NCAA.ORG (Aug.
16, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/
Latest+News/2011/August/NCAA+committee+asks+for+collaboration+in+new+
sport [hereinafter Brutlag Hosick 2] (discussing petition to make acrobatics and
tumbling emerging sport).  In response to the dual submissions, the NCAA Com-
mittee on Women’s Athletics asked the two groups to collaborate and “submit a
single proposal for consideration by the NCAA membership.” Id.
196. See Brutlag Hosick 2, supra note 195 (noting submission of two propos- R
als).  STUNT and Acrobatics and Tumbling are both sports that blend competitive
cheerleading and gymnastics. See id.
197. See id. (“In order for a sport to be considered for the NCAA Emerging
Sports for Women list, 20 or more varsity teams and/or competitive club teams
must currently exist on college campuses and . . . 10 letters of commitment must
be submitted from member institutions that sponsor or intend to sponsor the
sport.”).  A detailed proposal that includes among other things, rules for the sport,
financial considerations, and proposed recruiting practices, must also be submit-
ted to the NCAA for consideration. See id. (providing list of additional information
required by Committee).
198. See id. (detailing information requested by NCAA Committee before de-
cision is made).  The NCAA Committee on Women’s Athletics has expressed inter-
est “in seeing how the sport establishes itself.” Id. (setting forth justification for
lack of decision on whether to add competitive cheer to list of Emerging Sports).
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One reason the NCAA has not considered adding competitive
cheer to the list of Emerging Sports for Women is simply that not
enough teams exist.199  Additionally, USA Cheerleading and USA
Gymnastics cannot come to a consensus on the proper set of rules
to govern the activity.200  Specifically, STUNT and Acrobatics and
Tumbling primarily differ in the way their competitions are struc-
tured and their manner of scoring.201  The NCAA has requested
that the two groups submit a joint proposal, but as of this writing,
no proposal has been submitted.202
In order for competitive cheerleading to become an emerging
sport under NCAA rules, two courses of action are required.  First,
USA Cheerleading and USA Gymnastics must create a joint propo-
sal for submission to the NCAA Committee on Women’s Athlet-
ics.203  Second, there must be a cohesive effort among USA
Cheerleading, USA Gymnastics, NCATA, and academic institutions
to create varsity competitive cheerleading teams, or elevate club or
intramural teams to varsity status.204  The student-athletes needed
to form these teams are present in overwhelming numbers, compet-
ing as members of collegiate and private teams all across the coun-
try.205  More young adults may be inclined to join teams or stay on
teams longer if they knew with some certainty that once they reach
college, there may be academic scholarships available as a result of
199. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., No. 3:09-CV-621 SRU, 2013 WL 789612,
at *6 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2013) (“But due, in part, to competition from STUNT,
there are currently too few teams operating under the NCATA’s format to support
acro as emerging sport.”).
200. See Gregory, supra note 73, at 1 (discussing tension between USA Cheer- R
leading and USA Gymnastics).
201. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Taking Flight, NCAA.ORG (May 17, 2011),
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+
News/2011/May/Taking+flight [hereinafter Brutlag Hosick 3] (discussing differ-
ing characteristics of two proposals).
202. See Gregory, supra note 73, at 2 (discussing failure to submit joint R
proposal).
203. See Brutlag Hosick 2, supra note 195 (noting lack of joint proposal).  The R
two proposals originally submitted differ in key areas such as number of scholar-
ships offered in association with participation in sport, roster size, minimum num-
ber of competitions, and format of competition. See Brutlag Hosick 3, supra note
201 (describing differences in proposals). R
204. For a more detailed discussion of the small number of varsity teams that
exist, see supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text. R
205. See Alissa Figueroa, Cheerleading May Not Be a Sport, but It Is an Industry,
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Jul. 22, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Bus-
iness/new-economy/2010/0722/Cheerleading-may-not-be-a-sport-but-it-is-an-in-
dustry (noting that upwards of three million adolescents participate in
cheerleading nationwide).
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their competitive cheerleading skills.206  Without an effort from all
parties involved, growth of competitive cheerleading at the col-
legiate level may stagnate or stop altogether.207
VII. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s decision in Biediger, even taking the dis-
trict court’s most recent ruling into account, leaves the door open
for competitive cheerleading to be considered a sport under Title
IX, and leaders in the field of competitive cheerleading are gener-
ally optimistic.208  The effort to have competitive cheerleading be
counted as an Emerging Sport is ongoing.209  If there is enough
growth of competitive cheerleading to satisfy the requirements for
designation as an NCAA Emerging Sport and eventually an NCAA-
sanctioned sport, a successful case could be made in the future that
competitive cheerleading is a sport for purposes of Title IX.210
While some, including the executive director of the Universal
Cheerleaders Association, call the Biediger decision a minor setback,
this author respectfully disagrees.211  Competitive cheerleading is a
popular and well-established activity throughout the country and
the athletes are talented, ready, and willing to compete.212  As one
author aptly surmised, in the case of competitive cheerleading, the
206. See Drehs, supra note 3 (noting lack of NCAA benefits such as athletic R
scholarships); see also Deidre Silva, Infighting Complicates Cheerleading’s Future Status,
SPORTSPRESSNW.COM (Jun. 3, 2011), http://sportspressnw.com/2011/06/silva-in-
fighting-complicates-cheerleadings-future-status-2/ (“A situation now exists that a
starting high school quarterback has access to a college scholarship to play football
while the equally athletic head cheerleader sitting next to him in Spanish class is
offered few avenues to explore her chosen athletic activity after graduation.”).
207. See Thomas, supra note 7 (noting growth of competitive cheerleading R
over past thirty years).
208. See Judge: Cheerleading Not a Title IX Sport, ESPN.COM (Jul. 29, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5398814 (detailing statement by
executive director of USA Cheer that Biediger decision is “only a minor setback for
the efforts to make cheer an intercollegiate sport”).
209. See Brutlag Hosick 2, supra note 195 (discussing areas of competitive R
cheer that Committee on Women’s Athletics will be examining over coming
years).
210. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ. (Biediger III), 691 F.3d 85, 105 (2d Cir.
2012) (suggesting that if changes to system were made that competitive cheerlead-
ing may be eligible for “sport” designation under Title IX).
211. See Judge: Cheerleading Not a Title IX Sport, supra note 208 (“Bill Seely, the R
executive director of USA Cheer . . . said he believes the ruling represents only a
minor setback for the efforts to make cheer an intercollegiate sport.”).
212. See Figueroa, supra note 205 (noting high levels of participation of R
youth); see also Drehs supra note 3 (“Today, competitive cheerleading is one of the R
fastest-growing activities in the country.”).
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mantra should not be, “If you build it, they will come,” rather,
“They are already here, build it.”213
Jacqueline R. Liguori*
213. See Reich, supra note 34, at 560 (indicating typical willingness of OCR to R
recognize sports in order to foster interest in sport).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. The
Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, 2011.
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